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BOOK REVIEWS 
Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility, by John Martin 
Fischer and Mark Ravizza, S.J. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press, 1998. Pp. viii and 269 + 7 page index. $59.95 (hardcover). $19.95 
(paper). 
JOHN J. DAVENPORT, Fordham University 
Responsibility and Control is today the leading work in the compatibilist tra-
dition. Its argument that determinism is compatible with responsibility for 
actions, omissions, and their consequences is the comprehensive statement 
of a theory that began with Fischer's 1982 article on "Responsibility and 
Control." I Mark Ravizza joined this project in his first joint paper with 
Fischer on responsibility for inevitable actions and events.' The main pur-
pose of this new volume is to solve problems (highlighted by Peter van 
Inwagen, Carl Ginet, David Zimmerman, Eleonore Stump, Randolph 
Clarke, and others) with Fischer's recent sketch in The Metaphysics of Free 
Will of the theory of moral responsibility in terms of "guidance control" 
(which does not require the power to bring about alternatives).3 After a 
brief overview of Responsibility and Control, I will consider a new problem 
for the use of overdetermination cases in arguing for compatibilism. 
Finally I will show how this problem applies to the authors' new analysis 
of the origin of moral responsibility. 
1. An overview of the book 
In chapter one, the authors introduce their largely Strawsonian concep-
tion of moral responsibility and explain the direct and indirect threats deter-
minism can pose to moral responsibility. They focus on the "freedom-
relevant condition" of moral responsibility, i.e. the kind of control it requires 
rather than epistemic conditions associated with voluntary action (p.13). 
Following Harry Frankfurt's original critique of the Principle of Alternate 
Possibilities (PAP),' chapter two presents the basic argument from cases 
involving counterfactual and simultaneous interveners to "semicompatibil-
ism" or the thesis that moral responsibility does not in general require the 
kind of libertarian freedom or "regulative control" that is indeed incompati-
ble with global causal determinism. This basic argument is now 
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well-known to many readers. Consider a familiar case such as "Assassin," 
in which Sam shoots the mayor on his own, but could not have done other-
wise because Jack had previously implanted a radio-controlled neurostimu-
lator into Sam's brain and was ready to use it to force Sam to shoot the 
mayor if he showed any sign of wavering (Responsibility and Control, p.29). 
Since Sam is still responsible for shooting the mayor, the authors regard 
such cases as evidence that the agent's moral responsibility derives from 
features of the actual sequence that caused the action, rather than from alter-
native possibilities, even when these are available (p.37). The "guidance 
control" that responsible agents must display in the actual sequence has 
two aspects: it requires that the intentional process or psychological "mech-
anism" leading to the action be sane, or responsive in certain ways to rea-
sons for action, and that this sane psychic process be recognized by the 
agent as "his own," or as an expression of his agency (p.38-39). 
In chapters two and three, the authors concentrate on improving their 
account of the kind of reasons-responsiveness required by the first aspect of 
guidance control. They argue that moral responsibility requires that the 
mechanism from which the action flows (a) be "moderately" responsive to 
reasons (meaning that the agent can recognize a suitable range of reasons for 
doing otherwise, including moral reasons, that form a consistent and intelli-
gible pattern) and (b) be at least weakly reactive to such reasons (meaning 
that the agent would do otherwise at least some of the time she recognizes 
such reasons). This account solves many of the problems with the earlier 
model of guidance control in terms of "weak reasons-responsiveness," such 
as the unwanted implication that agents who are only erratically responsive 
to bizarre reasons can be responsible. Problems remain, which I cannot 
explore in this short review, but this new account presents one of the most 
sophisticated compatibilist models of sanity available in contemporary 
moral psychology. 
In chapter four, the authors are also largely successful in presenting a 
new account of "guidance control" over consequences of our acts and 
omissions, which provides a very effective response to van Inwagen's past 
arguments that responsibility for consequence-universals or states of 
affairs intuitively requires alternative possible consequences in this sense. 
Fischer and Ravizza show that in a range of cases, including van Inwagen's 
examples, what determines whether or not the agent is responsible for the 
consequence is not whether it is avoidable or inevitable, but whether the 
agent's act could have made a difference to the consequence in the prevail-
ing environment (pp.101-112). To test this, we hold fixed the background 
circumstances and omit other "triggering events" that count as causes of 
the relevant consequence at the same time or after the agent's act causes it 
(pp.113-120). Here again some problems remain, particularly in distin-
guishing between triggers and background conditions. But the onus will 
be on incompatibilists to find any serious flaws with the plausible position 
the authors map out. 
The analysis of responsibility for omissions in chapter five includes 
innovations based on this treatment of consequences.5 The authors begin 
with a "wide conception of omissions" according to which all failures are 
omissions/ and then canvass two sets of cases: in the first, it seems like the 
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unavoidability of an omission defeats responsibility; in the second, 
unavoidability seems compatible with responsibility. Following 
Frankfurt/ they argue that responsibility for simple failures to act is just a 
special case of responsibility for the bodily actions that constitute such fail-
ures (p.133). They then analyze complex omissions as cases in which the 
omitted bodily action brings about "a relatively narrowly specified nega-
tive consequence universal" (p.134). Just as for other consequences, they 
argue that when the unavoidability of this consequence-universal seems to 
defeat responsibility for the complex omission, this is not in fact because of 
its unavoidability per se but rather because its absence is not dependent in 
the required way on the absence of the agent's bodily action (p.135). This 
new analysis yields a symmetrical treatment of responsibility for actions 
and omissions, contra Susan Wolf's defense of an asymmetrical approach 
(pp.148-150).8 
In chapter six, Fischer and Ravizza also respond impressively to van 
Inwagen's so-called "direct argument" for the incompatibility of determin-
ism and responsibility by showing how simultaneous and counterfactual 
intervener examples can be devised to undermine van Inwagen's key trans-
fer principle in the direct argument. This analysis is impressive, but 1 doubt 
it can yield a positive argument for responsibility-determinism compatibil-
ism, because it cannot show that inevitability is compatible with responsi-
bility when the "ensuring condition" operates in the agent's own path within 
the actual sequence as a whole, as of course it would if universal determin-
ism held. But this Achilles heel of Fischer and Ravizza's response is a reflec-
tion, I think, of a deeper difficulty about the use of overdetem1ination cases 
to argue for compatibilism -the subject I turn to now. 
II. The fundamental problem with overdetermination-case 
arguments against PAP 
Several different types of objection have been raised against the kind of 
preemptive and simultaneous overdetermination cases on which Fischer 
and Ravizza rely throughout their book. These problems can be distin-
guished by looking at the general structure of overdetermination cases. 
Remember that the function of such examples is supposed to be to invali-
date alternative-possibility conditions on responsibility by building our 
intuitions that a given person P can be morally responsible for something X 
(a decision, an intention, a bodily action, or the consequences of such an 
action) even when X is inevitable or (equivalently) when possible worlds in 
which X does not occur are inaccessible to P. 
The persuasiveness of every overdetermination example, whether it 
involves simultaneous or counterfactual interveners, depends on a division 
of labor between two elements: one (R) which explains why the agent is 
responsible for X, and another (I) which explains why X is inevitable. The 
division consists in the fact that R and 1 are not in the same "pathway" (in 
Fischer and Ravizza's sense), even if both are present somewhere in the 
actual course of events as a whole. This anatomy of overdetermination 
cases can be illustrated first with the simple sort of example that started the 
disputes. In Frankfurt's "Neurologist" case, the inevitability-explaining 
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factor (I) is Black, who is prepared to intervene by triggering electrodes in 
Jones's brain to make him vote for Carter if he demonstrates any likelihood 
of trying to vote for Reagan. X of course is Jones's voting for Carter. And 
R is apparently (in the unanalyzed form of the example) just the fact that 
Jones deliberated about politics, formed the intention to vote for Carter, 
walked into the ballot box, and pulled the lever registering his vote all on 
his own, without any manipulation. Of course the largest part of the com-
patibilist's task is to analyze in much subtler terms just what conditions 
must be met by this process in the "pathway" leading up to Jones's actions 
for it to make X imputable to him. All the Neurologist example tries to do 
is show that an ability to bring it about that he refrains from X is no part of 
the R that makes X imputable to Jones. This point requires that the R and I 
factors do their work separately: the features of the scenario that make X 
imputable and the features that make X inevitable must be different and 
independent feahlres. 
We can now distinguish three broad types of objection to such cases. 
(1) Given this general structure, "Neurologist" and similar examples 
leave it up to further argument to show that the relevant X for which the 
agent is responsible and the X that is inevitable are the same X. This is the 
main issue in the dispute about whether Frankfurt-type cases leave 
"flickers of freedom."9 In chapter four on "Responsibility for 
Consequences" the authors respond effectively to van Inwagen's argu-
ment that we are not responsible for event-universals we cannot avoid, 
but only for event-particulars that we can avoid despite the presence of 
preemptive or simultaneous interveners. This still leaves open questions 
about other flicker-defenses of PAP, but since these are not addressed in 
Responsibility and Control, I will leave them aside here.lO 
(2) The structure of overdetermination cases also leaves it up to further 
argument to show that the I-factor in such examples ensures the inevitability 
of X without tacitly presupposing a kind of determinism inconsistent with 
libertariaIl or agent-causal conceptions of freedomY This is the issue in the 
ongoing debate about whether the signs that "trigger" intervention by coun-
terfactual interveners imply a question-begging detemUnism. Fischer and 
Ravizza do not pursue this debate in their book, but Fischer and others have 
defended the authors' position in recent exchanges on this questionY 
(3) There is a third and I think more fundamental kind of objection that 
focuses on the R- element in overdetermination cases that are supposed to 
count against PAP-principles. Fischer and Ravizza have done an 
admirable job addressing objections of type (1) and (2) by isolating a single 
set of R-features or responsibility-ensuring conditions that may explain 
responsibility for the relevant Xs across a variety of challenging cases. But 
although Fischer and Ravizza use overdetermination examples with great 
acuity, such examples can at best show that responsibility for some X can 
sometimes be locally compatible with X's unavoidability within a restricted 
context of inquiry that limits the focus to the relevant X. The very nature of 
overdetermination cases prevents them from showing us that the agent's 
responsibility for the relevant X is ever ultimately compatible with deter-
mirlism. 
Here's why. Such cases will intuitively persuade us that some X is both 
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imputable and unavoidable only if we assume that the agent is responsible for 
R, that is, for the feature (however interpreted or filled out) that makes his 
responsibility for X intuitive. But this assumption will seem plausible to all 
parties in the dispute only if they do not simultaneously stipulate that R 
itself is inevitable for the agent. Nor can the same overdetermination 
example focusing on X show us that R's inevitability would be compatible 
with the agent's responsibility for R, as required for his responsibility for X. 
Overdetermination cases instead rely on our presupposing that the agent's 
responsibility for R is plausible, without inquiring into the conditions of 
this responsibility, for their intuition-building work even to begin. For 
instance, in "Neurologist," we have to accept that Jones is responsible for 
deciding and intending to vote for Carter, before the example can demon-
strate that responsibility and inevitability are locally compatible in the case 
of Jones's voting for Carter. 
The same holds even if we start from a different compatibilist account of 
R in overdetermination cases. Take Frankfurt's willing addict, who in 
Frankfurt's view is dearly responsible for taking heroin because he "identi-
fies" with his desire for the drug (and with its compulsiveness). Here R is 
explained in terms of the agent's higher-order (or authoritative, or deep-
self-expressive) will to be an addict.\3 X = the agent's taking the drug, and I 
= the psychophysical addiction or the literal irresistibility of the desire. The 
factors that make X inevitable and imputable operate separately, and the 
example demonstrates that the agent is responsible for an inevitable X only 
if we presuppose that he is already responsible for the higher-order will that 
confers responsibility on X. This presupposition is not (and could not be) 
demonstrated nor its conditions analyzed in the willing addict case itself.14 
We find the same in more complex cases concerning responsibility for 
inevitable consequences. Take "Joint Assassin," in which Jack and Sam 
simultaneously shoot the mayor. Here the X for which Sam is apparently 
responsible is "the consequence universal, that the mayor is shot" (p.117). 
Fischer and Ravizza explain Sam's responsibility for this in a different way 
than Frankfurt did with his addict: in their analysis, R is a complex struc-
tural feature of the situation, namely that Sam's act issued from a suitably 
reasons-responsive mechanism and controlled the relevant outcome in 
(roughly) the sense that in the given causal environment, minus other trig-
gering events in other pathways (such as Jack's shooting), X would not 
have come about had Sam acted otherwise. On this account, R is a feature 
of the agent's path in the actual sequence: it specifically abstracts from the 
pathways in which other simultaneous triggers operate in the total actual 
sequence leading up to the mayor's untimely demise. But the I-factor that 
makes X inevitable is just such a trigger, namely Jack's firing his gun when 
and how he did. Now R and I do their work separately to ensure that X is 
both imputable to Sam and unavoidable. Yet R makes Sam responsible for 
X only if Sam is already responsible for R. And Joint Assassins cannot 
show us that his responsibility for the factors that constitute R (on the 
authors' analysis) is itself compatible with the inevitability of R. 
Every successful overdetermination example can be decomposed in the 
same way, and the same will be found in every case: the persuasiveness of 
such examples presupposes that we accept the agent's responsibility for 
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whatever feature R stands behind our intuition that he is responsible for 
the inevitable X, and this in tum requires that the R and I factors work 
independently. Compatibilist analyses of such examples have generally 
focused on giving an account of precisely what features play the R-role, or 
explain our intuition that the agent is responsible for the relevant X; they 
have not shown that responsibility for the factors they pick out as R is com-
patible with R's inevitability. Nor could they use overdetermination exam-
ples for this purpose without falling into a vicious regress. 
For instance, suppose Fischer and Ravizza wanted to show us that 
Sam's guidance control over X (the mayor's death) in Joint Assassins 
would still make Sam responsible for X even if we stipulated that the fea-
tures of the actual sequence constituting this guidance control were also 
inevitable for Sam. So they add some other factor F to Joint Assassins, such 
that F makes R (the guidance control) itself inevitable. Then F would by 
definition operate through the same pathway as R, not in a different path-
way as the I-factor does in persuasive overdetermination cases. As a 
result, suddenly the background assumption that Sam is responsible for R 
-which seemed so innocuous as long as the focus was on his responsibili-
ty for the mayor's death (=X)- becomes doubtful, because we have 
departed from the regular structure of overdetermination cases which 
alone preserves the intuitive unison of responsibility and inevitability. We 
would need some further reason not supplied in this 'Modified Joint 
Assassins' case to show why it is still plausible that Sam is responsible for 
X now that we stipulate that the moderately reasons-responsive mecha-
nism leading to his decision to shoot was itself inevitable for Sam. 
Suppose the authors tried to supply such a reason by inventing a differ-
ent case (C) in which the features that play the role of R in Joint Assassins 
now became the relevant X. Then in C we would have to have a new R 
and I for this X, and the agent's responsibility for our new R would again 
be presupposed and unexplained in C. There is no evident escape from 
this regress for the compatibilist. Thus in any overdetermination case that 
preserves the plausibility of the agent's responsibility for X, the possibility 
will be left open that what explains the agent's responsibility for R is that R 
(or some part of it) was agent-caused, or that R (or some part of it) was 
elected from among multiple alternatives the agent had the power to bring 
about. And either way, this means that the agent's responsibility for X will 
not be ultimately compatible with determinism. Nothing will prevent liber-
tarians from explaining responsibility for an inevitable X in any given 
overdetermination case by saying that the agent satisfied libertarian condi-
tions in bringing about (some part of) the features that play the R-role in 
that overdetermination case. This amounts to subsuming such cases via 
libertarian tracing principles. 
Thus even if the worries about triggers and flickers of freedom can be 
overcome, Fischer and Ravizza's examples will only succeed in building 
part of the intuition the authors want: they may indeed show that agents 
can sometimes be responsible for unavoidable event-universals, acts, and 
perhaps some decisions, and hence that responsibility and inevitability are 
sometimes locally compatible. But libertarians are already prepared to con-
cede this much on the strength of traditional examples: a man who 
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knowingly locks himself in a room is responsible for remaining therein, 
even though he cannot do otherwise, because his predicament is a foreseen 
result of an unmanipulated choice between alternatives. Libertarians modi-
fy their PAP-type principles with tracing principles to cover such cases, just 
as Fischer and Ravizza allow that an agent can be responsible in a deriva-
tive manner for an action that does not result from a moderately reasons-
responsive mechanism if this itself is due to prior acts for which she is 
responsible in the primary manner, because they flowed from moderately 
reasons-responsive mechanisms (p.49-50). Responsibility for actions is thus 
locally compatible with actions flowing from irrational mechanisms on 
Fischer and Ravizza's account, but not ultimately compatible with non-
reasons-responsiveness. Libertarians make analogous accommodations in 
tracing principle revisions to PAP principles for decisions, intentions, 
actions, and consequences. Thus if overdetermination examples show no 
more than a local compatibility of responsibility and inevitability, then they 
are no serious threat to libertarian intuitions about the ultimate conditions 
on moral responsibility. Therefore such a "tracing-defense" against overde-
termination cases is not ad hoc: it focuses on a problem that any theory of 
responsibility must address, whether it is compatibilist or incompatibilist.15 
Ill. The New Account of Responsibility for Psychological Mechanisms 
Since this tracing objection was presented in such a schematic form, it 
will help to see how it applies more concretely to Fischer and Ravizza's own 
positive account. In Responsibility and Control, the authors confront the 
problem that a suitably reasons-responsive mechanism M can make us 
responsible for an action, omission, or their consequences, only if we are 
already responsible for M. Perhaps, the incompatibilist will say, we are 
only responsible for M if it (or some crucial part of it) is agent-caused or 
chosen from among alternatives we had the power to realize.16 Indeed such 
agent-causal and libertarian accounts of responsibility for psychological 
mechanisms provide one clear way out of a familiar objection to Fischer's 
earlier statement of his model, i.e. that suitably reasons-responsive mecha-
nisms could be produced in the agent by brainwashing, neurological 
manipulation, divine intervention, and so on. Libertarian or agent-causal 
accounts would deal decisively with this source-problem by ensuring that we 
are not responsible for psychological mechanisms deriving from coercion or 
artificial interference. Fischer and Ravizza therefore had to describe and 
defend an alternative compatibilist account of responsibility for psychologi-
cal mechanisms. 
They do this in the final two chapters of Responsibility and Control, which 
layout an impressive argument for an "historical" conception of responsibil-
ity according to which the agent acquires the subjective conditions for 
regarding himself as a moral agent (or a fair target of reactive attitudes) 
through a process of acculturation and initiation into the language-game of 
holding persons responsible and ascribing responsibility to oneself. 
Through three stages -"'training,' 'taking responsibility,' and 'being held 
responsible'" by others (p.210)--- the young person learns to become respon-
sible for the sort of psychological mechanisms that can in turn make her 
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responsible for particular acts, omissions, and consequences. The crucial 
step is the middle one: "'The process by which an agent takes responsibility 
for the springs of his action makes them his own in an important sense" 
(p.210). Although I cam10t do justice to the details of their account, in sum 
taking responsibility for mechanisms involves three basic conditions: 
(a) First, the individual learns to see her psychological states -
such as belief, desire, choice, and intention- as "the causal 
source ... of upshots in the world" (p.210-11). 
(b) Second, "the individual must accept that he is the fair target of 
reactive attitudes as a result of how he exercises this agency in 
certain contexts." If the individual is not prone to philosophical 
reflection, this need involve no more than a sense that it is "part 
of our given social practices" for others to praise, blame, and 
react to him as a result of his agency in some non-arbitrary 
range of contexts (p.211). 
(c) Third, the individual's internal view of himself as a moral agent 
constituted by these first two sets of beliefs must be based in 
"an appropriate way" on "his evidence for these beliefs," which 
will include recognizing the causal effectiveness of his choices 
and actions, learning the moral language game by experiencing 
social practices (p.213), and presumably learning that he can 
conform his actions to social expectations. The training and 
moral address of the community constituted in this language-
game provides the necessary evidence for the individual's self-
ascription of responsibility to count as rational (p.214). 
The result of this process is that the individual becomes accustomed to 
thinking of actions that flow from familiar kinds of psychological mecha-
nisms (including not only reflective deliberation and prudence but also 
habit and unreflective desire-gratification) as flowing from her. Acceptance 
of action-ownership through mechanism-ownership becomes virtually 
automatic unless there are special features of the case that could lead the 
agent to exempt herself. Thus we do not take responsibility directly or 
case-by-case for each particular mechanism-token behind each of our acts: 
rather, "Having taken responsibility for behavior that issues from a kind of 
mechanism, it is almost as if the agent had some sort of standing policy 
with respect to that kind of mechanism" (p.216). 
On the basis of this theory, Fischer and Ravizza argue that an agent can-
not take responsibility for certain psychological mechanisms that are not 
reasons-responsive, such as irresistible desires or subconscious suggestion 
implanted by neurological manipulation (p.232). Similarly, although a rea-
sons-responsive mechanisms could be directly induced by external inter-
ference, agents have normally taken responsibility for such mechanisms 
only as "uninfluenced by such factors as subliminal advertising, direct 
electronic stimulation of the brain, and so forth" (p.233). The complete 
manipulation-mechanism will not be among those mechanisms for which 
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the agent has taken responsibility, since even if she thinks she is acting on a 
normal psychological mechanism, she is not: "In a case in which a moder-
ately reasons-responsive mechanism is implanted without an agent's 
awareness, the agent has not taken responsibility for the kind of mecha-
nism that issues in action" (p.234). 
Finally, the authors consider whether an agent's standing policy of recog-
nizing that she is ordinarily responsible for actions flowing from familiar 
kinds of psychological mechanisms could itself be manipulated. They 
admit, "it is conceivable that the individual's view of himself as an agent and 
an apt candidate for the reactive attitudes be electronically implanted" 
(pp.235-6). But they respond that such an agent would not have formed the 
required view of himself "in the appropriate way," based on reality-tracking 
evidence, as required by the third condition on taking responsibility (p.236). 
Instead he would have been deceived, deluded, or tricked, and should not 
be held responsible by one who knows the full story. 
Despite its improvements, problems remain in this account. Drawing 
on Robert Heinlein, Eleonore Stump has argued that an agent could be 
manipulated into taking responsibility for a psychological mechanism M 
that he knows has been implanted (perhaps by inculcating a false philo-
sophical ideology).17 Her case seems to be analogous to Gettier-cases in 
epistemology: the beliefs that constitute "taking responsibility" for M on 
Fischer and Ravizza's account are not directly implanted, but are rather 
motivated by staging the kind of appropriate evidence the agent needs to 
be warranted in such beliefs, on their account. Such cases show that an 
omnipotent manipulator could bring it about that the agent has true and 
justified beliefs about his psychological mechanism that constitute "taking 
responsibility" for it, yet not really be responsible for it. This also suggests 
how hard it is to trace responsibility for actions to responsibility for mecha-
nisms without tracing mechanism-responsibility itself to incompatibilist 
sources that rule out manipulation. 
But I want to focus on a more limited point: it is at any rate impossible 
to use overdetermination cases to argue that the conditions of responsibili-
ty for psychological mechanisms are ultimately compatible with determin-
ism. In chapter eight §7, the authors argue that counterfactual-intervener 
cases give a philosophically reflective agent reason to believe that responsi-
bility for psychological mechanisms is compatible with their being 
inevitable. For in such cases: 
the actual-sequence mechanism is, intuitively, the agent's own, 
whereas the alternative- scenario mechanism is not. But the 
Frankfurt-type cases are entirely consistent with causal determin-
ism's being true. Another way of making the point is that causal 
determinism in itself does not imply that all sequences are relevantly 
similar to the alternative scenario of a Frankfurt-type case, in which 
there is, for example, significant direct manipulation of the brain (and 
thus the mechanism is not the agent's own) (p.228). 
This is true, but it misleadingly implies that absence of direct interference 
from other agents, machines, or natural events must be sufficient for the 
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mechanism to count as the agent's own. Counterfactual-intervener cases 
do not show this: they merely presuppose that the mechanism on which the 
agent acts in the actual sequence (as opposed to the counterfactual 
sequence) is her own, and invite the reader to go along with this assump-
tion for the purpose of seeing that the agent can thereby become responsible 
for some inevitable decision, action, or consequence. We cannot learn from 
such cases whether the agent's ownership of (or responsibility for) the 
mechanism on which he acted requires that the mechanism originated in 
libertarian choice, or agent-causation, or neither. Thus if a Frankfurt-type 
case is one in which the agent is by hypothesis responsible for what she 
does 'on her own' in the actual sequence, it has yet to be proven that 
"Frankfurt-type cases are entirely consistent with causal determinism's 
being true," as the authors assume. 
This is the deepest problem with Fischer and Ravizza's argument, and it 
is relevant to a wide body of literature in which it has not been dearly rec-
ognized before. But this should not obscure the fact that Responsibility and 
Control is full of challenging new ideas and ingenious responses to better-
known objections. Aside from being well-written and enjoyable to read, it 
is the fruition of the entire tradition stemming from Frankfurt's 1969 paper, 
which has become the dominant tradition in compatibilism today. 
Although some amendments may be proposed, I doubt that a more sys-
tematic presentation of this tradition's approach will soon be attempted or 
achieved. This makes the book essential reading not only for graduate 
seminars on free will but also for philosophers interested in related prob-
lems about freedom and divine foreknowledge. 
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